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LEVIN V. COMMERCE ENERGY: ONE STEP
FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK
MARSHALL BROAD†
The foundation of the United States government is rooted in
federalism, “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power
between the national and regional governments within a federal
system of government.”1 That concept is expressed through
comity, the principle that political entities will respect the acts of
other political entities, whether those acts be legislative,
executive, or judicial.2 As applied to the relationship between
federal and state courts, Justice Black penned the quintessential
definition:
‘[C]omity’ . . . is, a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.3

In practice, comity means that federal courts will not interfere
with state administration—including, but not limited to, criminal
proceedings,
interpretation
of
state
law,
and
tax
administration—as long as the “asserted federal right may be
preserved without [such interference].”4 From 1871 to 1939,
federal courts exclusively relied on comity to decline jurisdiction
over lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws.5
In 1939, the Congress codified the principle of comity as applied
to state tax laws in the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), which forbids
federal courts from interfering with the “assessment, levy, or
†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s School
of Law; B.A., College of William and Mary, 2004.
1
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009). In the United States, that power
is divided between the federal government and the individual state governments.
2
Id. at 303–04.
3
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
4
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932).
5
See, e.g., Dows v. City of Chi., 78 U.S. 108 (1870).
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collection” of a state tax as long as a “plain, speedy, and efficient
remedy” is available in state court.6 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court continued to use comity as a bar to lawsuits challenging
state taxes alongside the TIA.7 In 2004, however, the Supreme
Court held in Hibbs v. Winn that a lawsuit by a third party
challenging a state tax credit could proceed in federal court and
that neither the TIA nor comity barred the action.8 As a result,
several circuit courts held that comity should only be applied to a
lawsuit challenging a state tax if the relief requested would
disrupt the state’s tax revenue.9 One circuit court held that
comity had not been so constrained by Hibbs, reasoning that the
Hibbs decision was limited to the unusual facts presented in that
case.10
Recently, in Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., the Supreme
Court considered the scope of Hibbs’s limitation of comity in
order to resolve the circuit split.11
Levin dealt with tax
exemptions offered by Ohio to natural gas providers. Ohio
residents who wish to purchase natural gas may do so from one
of two alternatives: a local distribution company (“LDC”) or an
independent marketer (“IM”).12 Under Ohio tax law, LDCs
receive several tax exemptions that IMs do not.13 In response to
these tax exemptions, two IMs—plaintiffs Commerce Energy,

6

Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582,
586, 592 (1995) (relying on principles of comity to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not allow for injunctive or declaratory relief in suits challenging state taxes).
8
542 U.S. 88, 94 (2004).
9
See Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 17 (1st Cir. 2009);
Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 F.3d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 2009); Levy v.
Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1109–10
(9th Cir. 2005). Each of these cases cited to the same language, found in a single
footnote, from Hibbs. See, e.g., Commerce Energy, Inc., 554 F.3d at 1099 (citing
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004)).
10
DIRECTV v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 127–28 (4th Cir. 2008).
11
Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010).
12
Id. at 2328. The primary difference between LDCs and IMs is that LDCs both
sell and deliver natural gas to customers, since they own and operate the pipelines
necessary to transport the gas. Id. IMs merely sell the gas and rely on the LDCs to
deliver it for them. Id.
13
Id. (“First, LDCs’ natural gas sales are exempt from sales and use taxes.
LDCs owe instead a gross receipts excise tax, which is lower than the sales and use
taxes IMs must collect. Second, LDCs are not subject to the commercial activities tax
imposed on IMs’ taxable gross receipts. Finally, Ohio law excludes inter-LDC
natural gas sales from the gross receipts tax, which IMs must pay when they
purchase gas from LDCs.” (citations omitted)).
7
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Inc. and Interstate Gas Supply, Inc.—as well as a customer of
Interstate Gas Supply—plaintiff Gregory Slone—brought suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against
Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.14 The plaintiffs
alleged that the tax exemptions enjoyed by the LDCs were
discriminatory in nature and violated both the Commerce and
Equal Protection Clauses.15 The plaintiffs requested declaratory
and injunctive relief so that the LDCs could no longer take
advantage of the exemptions.16
At trial, the defendant made a motion to dismiss on several
grounds, including that both the TIA and comity barred the
plaintiffs’ suit.17 The district court granted the motion to dismiss
on comity grounds.18 The district court first held that the TIA did
not bar the suit, because the plaintiffs were challenging a thirdparty’s tax benefit and the relief requested would not negatively
affect state revenue.19 The court reasoned, however, that comity
would bar the suit, because the relief requested by the plaintiffs
would force Ohio to collect more taxes than its legislature had
desired and such interference with state taxation by federal
courts would be inappropriate.20 While a state court could either
remove the exemptions or extend them to the plaintiffs,
according to the district court, the Tax Injunction Act would only
allow a federal court to do the former, and a federal court should
not impose one remedy on a state when two possible remedies are
available.21
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court.22 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the TIA did not bar the
suit but disagreed that comity would bar it.23 Relying on a
footnote from Hibbs v. Winn, the court held that comity could
only be used to decline jurisdiction over a suit challenging a state
tax law if the suit would disrupt state tax collection.24 The court

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 2328–29.
Id.
Id. at 2329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004)).

38

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW COMMENTARY

[Vol. 84:35

expressed concern that “[a] broad view of the comity
cases . . . would render the TIA ‘effectively superfluous.’ ”25 It
concluded that the suit would not intrude on state tax
administration and remanded the case for trial.26 In so holding,
the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, which had also held that footnote nine of the Hibbs
decision had narrowed the scope of comity.27
Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for certiorari, which
the Supreme Court granted in order to resolve the circuit split
regarding the scope of the comity doctrine following Hibbs v.
Winn.28
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the decision in Hibbs v. Winn,29
delivered the Court’s decision. The Court first characterized the
lawsuit as one challenging an uneven tax burden, thus
distinguishing Levin from Hibbs, which concerned a state tax
benefit enjoyed by a third party.30 Thus, Levin did not fall under
the exceptions to comity created by the TIA or by Court in Hibbs.
Echoing the district court’s reasoning, the Court then held that
comity precluded the federal courts from hearing the plaintiff’s’
lawsuit.31 The Court dismissed the argument of the Sixth Circuit
regarding the relationship between comity and the TIA, noting
that Congress passed the TIA to close two loopholes in the comity
doctrine.32 Finally, the Court declined to address the issue of
“whether the TIA would itself block the suit,” relying on the

25
Id. (quoting Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 554 F.3d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir.
2009), rev’d, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010)).
26
Id. at 2330.
27
Id. at 2329 (citing Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilbur v.
Locke, 423 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005)).
28
Id. at 2330.
29
542 U.S. 88.
30
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2335 (“The plaintiffs in Hibbs were outsiders to the tax
expenditure, ‘third parties’ whose own tax liability was not a relevant factor. In this
case, by contrast, the very premise of respondents’ suit is that they are taxed
differently from LDCs. Unlike the Hibbs plaintiffs, respondents do object to their
own tax situation, measured by the allegedly more favorable treatment accorded
LDCs.”).
31
Id. at 2334.
32
Id. at 2336 (“By closing these loopholes, Congress secured the doctrine against
diminishment.”).
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principle that, when a federal court is confronted with two
different but equally valid grounds for dismissal, it may choose
whichever grounds it wants to dismiss a case.33
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Hibbs
v. Winn,34 filed a brief concurrence, which restated his objection
to the rationale used by the Court in Hibbs, and expressed his
understanding that the Levin opinion did not expand Hibbs’s
holding.35 Justice Alito also filed a brief concurrence, expressing
“doubt[ ] about the Court’s efforts to distinguish [Hibbs],” and
declining to comment on “whether [the Court’s] holding
undermines Hibbs’ foundations.”36
Justice Thomas filed a more extensive opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which Justice Scalia joined.37 He began by
echoing the skepticism of Justice Kennedy regarding the
rationale of the Hibbs decision, noting that Hibbs did not
preclude application of comity or the TIA to the present case.38
Though Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that the case
could be dismissed on comity grounds, he argued that the case
should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds under the TIA,
arguing that the court had misinterpreted its holding in
Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping
Corp.39 Rather than standing for the proposition that a federal
court may choose between two equally valid grounds for
dismissal, Justice Thomas argued that, under Sinochem, a
federal court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds as long as
it would not require an “arduous inquiry.”40 Justice Thomas
concluded by offering an explanation for the majority’s decision to

33
Id. at 2336–37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co.
v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007)).
34
See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 112–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2337 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36
Id. at 2339 (Alito, J., concurring).
37
Id. at 2337–39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 2337.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 2338 (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 436 (2007)) (stating that judicial economy is the primary concern when a
federal court is confronted with two valid grounds for dismissal). Though various
federal courts have referred to “declining jurisdiction” when applying the comity
doctrine, comity is not a jurisdictional ground for dismissal. Id. at 2337. Rather,
comity is a “prudential doctrine.” Id. at 2336.
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dismiss on comity grounds rather than jurisdictional grounds: a
desire to “leave the door open” to hearing certain cases in federal
court rather than state court.41
Part I of this Comment examines the Court’s application of
the comity doctrine. Specifically, Part I looks at the Court’s
attempts to distinguish its holding in Hibbs from its prior comity
holdings. Part I then critiques the Court’s application of comity
in both Hibbs and Levin in light of its analysis in the latter and
argues that its decision in Levin did not go far enough in limiting
the holding of Hibbs. Part II analyzes the Court’s decision not to
address whether the TIA would apply to Levin. Part II concludes
that the Court incorrectly exercised its discretion when it chose
to not discuss the TIA and that its authority for doing so was
misplaced.
I.

THE OLD HIBBS RULE AND THE NEW LEVIN RULE

In footnote nine of the Hibbs decision, the Court wrote it has
“relied upon ‘principles of comity’ . . . to preclude original federalcourt jurisdiction only when plaintiffs have sought district-court
aid in order to arrest or countermand state tax collection.”42 On
its face, the language from Hibbs supports the First, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ conclusion that comity only applies
when a plaintiff’s requested relief would disrupt state tax
collection. Despite this, some authorities understood the Court’s
statement with respect to comity to be a narrow one.43 The latter
view is more in line with the Court’s comity precedent.
Clearly unhappy with how the circuit courts had interpreted
the footnote, the Court sought to narrow the scope of the Hibbs
exception by distinguishing Hibbs from Levin.44 In Hibbs, an
41

Id. at 2338–39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004).
43
See Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Hibbs, therefore,
leaves the doors of the federal court open to a narrow category of state tax
challenges.” (emphasis added)); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir.
2005) (“Hibbs opened the federal courthouse doors slightly notwithstanding the
limits of the TIA, but it did so only where (1) a third party (not the taxpayer) files
suit, and (2) the suit’s success will enrich, not deplete, the government entity’s
coffers.” (emphasis added)); see also Paul V. McCord, The Dormant Commerce Clause
and the MBT Credit and Incentive Scheme: You Can’t Get There from Here, 53
WAYNE L. REV. 1431, 1485 (2007) (surmising that Hibbs “open[ed] the door, ever so
slightly, to federal court”).
44
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332 (“[Hibbs and Levin] differ markedly in ways bearing
on the comity calculus.”).
42
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Arizona statute awarded tax credits to organizations that
provided scholarship grants for students who attended private
elementary and secondary schools.45 The statute did not prevent
an organization from giving scholarships solely to children who
attended private, religious institutions.46 A group of Arizona
taxpayers sued the director of Arizona’s Department of Revenue
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the tax
credits violated the Establishment Clause.47 The plaintiffs asked
for both injunctive and declaratory relief.48 Because the plaintiffs
did not and could never enjoy the tax credits at issue, they were
“outsiders.”49 In Levin, the plaintiffs challenged a state tax
exemption and sought similar injunctive relief. The plaintiffs
were not “outsiders,” according to the Court, because the entire
point of their lawsuit was that they were taxed differently; they
“object[ed] to their own tax situation, measured by the allegedly
more favorable treatment accorded LDCs.”50
This distinction, however, is not persuasive. The only
appreciable difference between the plaintiffs in the two cases, a
difference to which the Court gives great weight, is that the
plaintiffs in Levin were direct competitors of the LDCs, whereas
the plaintiffs in Hibbs had no relationship at all with the
organizations receiving the tax benefit.51 Justice Thomas made a
similar point in his concurrence.52
Such a distinction is
ultimately irrelevant, though, because both sets of plaintiffs
sought to improve their own position. The Levin plaintiffs sought
to undermine their competitors, while the Hibbs plaintiffs sought
to increase state tax revenue, which would, theoretically, benefit
all Arizona taxpayers. Thus, both the majority and concurring
opinions have fallen prey to one of the very concerns that Justice
Thomas considered: The application of the comity doctrine is
now “little more than a pleading game.”53 Furthermore, one of

45

Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 95.
Id.
47
Id. at 88.
48
Id. at 96.
49
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2335 (“The plaintiffs in Hibbs were outsiders to the tax
expenditure, ‘third parties’ whose own tax liability was not a relevant factor.”).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 2335–36.
52
Id. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring).
53
Id.
46
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the plaintiffs in Levin, Gregory Slone, was not objecting to his tax
burden at all.54 The Court makes no attempt to distinguish his
position from that of the Hibbs plaintiffs.
Even if the distinction between the two cases is a real one, it
does not explain the language used in Hibbs. The Court plainly
states in Levin that federal courts used comity to avoid
interfering with state taxation generally, not state tax collection
exclusively.55 This statement is in accord with the precedent of
the Court in its comity cases.56 In an attempt to reconcile the
rule in Hibbs with the Court’s comity precedent, the Levin Court
emphasized the status of the plaintiff—outsider or insider—as
determinative of whether comity should apply. Yet the language
of footnote nine in Hibbs makes it clear that the effect of the
requested relief—specifically, whether the requested relief would
disrupt state tax revenue—is the determinative factor.57 These
two statements are at odds and, if not for the Court’s explicit
statement that its decision in Hibbs “has a more modest reach”
than the circuit courts had stated,58 it would appear as if Levin
created a whole new rule, separate and apart from the Hibbs
rule.
Unfortunately, the way in which the Court used Levin to
recast the rule in Hibbs has the result of making the rule less
concrete. Though the original Hibbs rule was contrary to the
Supreme Court’s comity precedent, it at least had the benefit of
being straightforward and relatively easy to apply. The new
Levin rule makes the comity analysis much murkier. The facts of
Levin itself demonstrate the difficulties that arise under the new
rule. For example, the Court goes through great lengths to
demonstrate how the plaintiffs are challenging their own tax
liabilities. But the Court does not once mention plaintiff Gregory
Slone, an IM customer. Unlike the other plaintiffs, he did not

54

See infra Part II.
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2330 (“Comity’s constraint has particular force when
lower federal courts are asked to pass on the constitutionality of state taxation of
commercial activity.”).
56
See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582,
586 (1995) (“We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity
generally counsel that courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state
tax administration.”).
57
The decisions of the circuit courts in the wake of Hibbs indicate as much. See
cases cited supra note 9.
58
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332.
55

2011]

COMMENT: LEVIN V. COMMERCE ENERGY

43

object to his own tax situation; the tax provisions in question only
affected the natural gas suppliers. On the other hand, he does
stand to benefit from the relief requested, in the form of a lower
gas bill. Under the new Levin analysis, it is unclear whether he
is an insider or an outsider, and it is unclear whether a
complaint brought by Slone alone could be heard in federal
court.59
Perhaps, though, this was the intended result of the majority
opinion. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence, the
application of comity to the Levin case leaves the door open for
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state taxation cases
whenever they see fit, just as long as they can frame the plaintiff
as an “insider.”60 As in the case of plaintiff Slone in Levin, it is
possible to see him as either an insider or an outsider. The new
rule created in Levin decreases certainty in litigation, allows for
even more confusion among the circuit courts, and potentially
opens the doors to federal court wider than even the Hibbs
footnote had.
II. DOES A FEDERAL COURT HAVE DISCRETION TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN TWO EQUALLY VALID GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL?
In supporting its decision to dismiss the case on the basis of
comity rather than the TIA, the Court cited to two cases which,
according to the Court, stood for the proposition that a court may
choose between two equally valid grounds for dismissal.61 In
59
A recent district court decision demonstrates the potential difficulties of the
Levin rule. In Joseph v. Hyman, the district court held that it could not hear a
challenge made by commuters to a parking tax exemption given to residents of
Manhattan. No. 09 Civ. 7555(RJS), 2010 WL 3528854, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30,
2010). The court likened the plaintiffs in Joseph to the plaintiffs in Levin, arguing
that both were, in effect, challenging their own tax liability. Id. at *4. How the
plaintiffs in Levin and Joseph “objected to an exemption awarded to another
taxpayer,” and the plaintiffs in Hibbs did not, is left unexplained. Id. Instead, the
court focused on the plaintiffs’ grounds for their lawsuit: that the “tax differential is
unconstitutional.” Id.
60
Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2338–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I see only one
explanation for the Court’s decision to dismiss on a ‘prudential’ ground (comity)
rather than a mandatory one (jurisdiction): The Court wishes to leave the door open
to doing in future cases what it did in Hibbs, namely, retain federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims that the Court simply does not believe Congress should have
entrusted to state judges under the Act.” (citations omitted)).
61
Id. at 2336–37 (majority opinion) (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299, 301 (1943)).
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Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, the Court dismissed
a claim challenging a state tax on comity grounds rather than on
TIA grounds.62 In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
International Shipping Corp., the Court dismissed a case on
forum non conveniens grounds rather than on jurisdictional
grounds.63
The Court’s reliance on both Great Lakes and Sinochem was
misplaced; the former is distinguishable and the latter
contradicts the Court’s conclusion. The Great Lakes Court chose
not to apply the TIA because the plaintiff had requested
declaratory relief, and by its plain language the TIA applied only
to claims seeking an injunction; had the Court dismissed the case
under the TIA, it would have expanded the statute in a way
theretofore unknown.64 Rather than expand the TIA beyond its
plain statutory language, the Court relied on comity, a doctrine
already in force.65 That is a situation very different from a court
facing two equally valid grounds for dismissal. The Sinochem
case presented a situation more analogous to the issue in Levin,
since the Court had two equally valid grounds for dismissing the
case. The Court’s decision in Sinochem, however, is at odds with
the Levin decision. In Sinochem, the Court wrote:
If, however, a court can readily determine that it lacks
jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper course
would be to dismiss on that ground. . . . [W]here subject-matter
or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and forum non
conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissal,
the court properly takes the less burdensome course.66

62

Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 299, 301.
Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 436.
64
Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 299 (“But we find it unnecessary to inquire whether
the words of the statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal
courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax.”).
65
Id. (“[W]e are of the opinion that those considerations which have led federal
courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional
cases, require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.”).
The Supreme Court would, eventually, expand the TIA to cover requests for
declaratory judgment. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408
(1982).
66
Sinochem, 548 U.S. at 436.
63

2011]

COMMENT: LEVIN V. COMMERCE ENERGY

45

The plain language of the Sinochem decision indicates that a
federal court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, unless it
would be burdensome or difficult to do so.67
Other cases accord with the language from Sinochem and
indicate that the Court’s decision in Levin was incorrect. In
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., upon which Sinochem relied,
the Court noted that “[i]t is hardly novel for a federal court to
choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case
on the merits.”68 Though in that case, the federal court could
have chosen between two jurisdictional grounds for dismissal, the
Ruhrgas Court cited to several examples of cases where a federal
court correctly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds before
considering any nonjurisdictional grounds for dismissal.69 For
example, in Ellis v. Dyson, the district court dismissed a case
based on Younger abstention, a jurisdictional ground for
dismissal, before considering whether there was a case or in its
place controversy.70 Thus, the Court’s decisions in Sinochem and
Ruhrgas indicate that, though a federal court does have
discretion to choose between equally valid grounds for dismissal,
a court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds if they are
available. With that understanding of the Court’s precedent, the
Levin Court should have addressed whether the TIA applied and
dismissed on those grounds if appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court correctly limited the scope of the
rule it created in footnote nine of Hibbs v. Winn, it did so in a
way that is counterproductive. The new rule pronounced in
Levin does not make clear which state tax claims a federal court
may hear and only muddies the waters of the comity doctrine
further. The Levin rule essentially allows federal courts to pick
and choose which state tax claims they want to hear. Such a rule
defeats the purpose of comity, which calls for federal judicial
deference to the rights of the states to self-administration. To
67

Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999); see also Sinochem,
548 U.S. at 485.
69
Id. (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1975); Moor v. Cnty. of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715–16 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
70
Ellis, 421 U.S. at 436 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider its
decision in light of a recent Court holding. Id. at 435 (majority opinion).
68

46

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW COMMENTARY

[Vol. 84:35

arrive at this result, the Court ignored precedent that called for
it to analyze the case under the Tax Injunction Act before
proceeding to a comity analysis. Again, this serves to undermine
the comity doctrine, by allowing federal courts to choose which
state tax claims to hear. The principles of comity and federalism
do not call for this result.

